



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ASSOCIATION.¹

I.

THE various attempts to describe and interpret the phenomena of associate life have left upon the minds of those making such attempts a very definite impression that the problems encountered were far from simple. Human society, as it exists today among civilized races, is a reality which embodies the most complex and highly evolved activities of the most complex and highly evolved organisms known to our intelligence. And since these organisms have an evolution which proceeds, phylogenetically, from primitive protoplasm and recapitulates, ontogenetically, a considerable number of its earlier phases, we need not be surprised, perhaps, that their activities should be difficult, indeed, of adequate analysis and interpretation. Certain it is that these activities are multiplied and various; that they are blended with, and melted into, each other in a manner to render their isolation extremely difficult. Again, they are most bafflingly evanescent, while their sphere of manifestation is so vast as to put a comprehensive survey of its reaches practically beyond the power of the individual investigator. Because of these characteristics the attempts at the systematic observation and analysis of the phenomena of society have been constantly threatened with the danger of attaining, at most, only a qualified success.

Fronting such difficulties, the majority of investigators seem to have been impelled, according to circumstances and type of mind, in one of two general directions. Apparently they have been inclined either toward the ascertainment and exhibition of the laws, principles, elements, etc., of the whole mass of fact conveniently styled "societary," or else to devote their energies

¹ Other papers, dealing with the subject in a more positive way, will appear at convenient intervals. The object of the present article is to present certain general considerations preliminary to a more specific treatment of particular phases of the subject-matter.

solely to the descriptive and analytic consideration of the characteristics of some one phase of the entire phenomenal complex. It is unnecessary to discuss here the relative vulnerability of these two points of attack or to compare at length the merits of the different methods of approach appropriate to each. It is probable that each point of attack is of high significance, and that each method is destined to play a part of great import to the general development of the science of sociology.

Were this a comparative study of sociologies, rather than of the subject-matter of sociology, it would be of interest at this point to make an analysis of the works of the various writers upon subjects social, to the end of determining the motives, particular phases treated, points of attack, methods of procedure, and substantial results of each. After this preliminary step had been taken and each work had been, as it were, "reduced to its elements," it would then be in order to make the further attempt, through a still more searching analysis and comparison, to trace back all these elements to certain fundamental factors, and, having found these factors, to exhibit synthetically the coördination and correlation of the whole about them as it has actually occurred thus far in the process of growth. To be sure, the relation to the entire age environment would have to be kept constantly in view at each step, but when the whole task had been completed, it would be surprising, indeed, were it not discovered that in large degree these different works form parts—widely sundered, possibly—of a developing unity whose symmetries, naturally, can be but vaguely foreshadowed in the early evolution of a comparatively small number of its constituent factors. Such a comprehensive survey of the field, however, would of itself require many pages, and must, therefore, be left to another time and place. It will answer our purpose here to anticipate one of its possible results in calling attention to a trait which, in varying degree, seems to be characteristic of the majority of the works thus far appearing under titles which may be classed as sociological.

Influenced partly by the prevailing trend of thought, which is wont to consider each fact as a term in a genetic series,

partly by the force of certain illustrious examples, and in part also by the possible advantages for analysis and explanation to be gained in so doing, sociologists, while dealing with the phenomena of human association, have been in the habit of making use of "analogies" drawn from the phenomena of association as these are found among forms of life lower than man. This habit is so widespread, and in many instances so marked, as to command serious consideration from anyone making a study such as the one alluded to above. It is as though there existed a tacit assumption that, in the task of describing and interpreting human association, help is in some way to be gotten from references to associational phenomena as exhibited by lower forms of life.¹

That this assumption is not without foundation the writer considers there are good grounds for asserting. *A priori* it seems as reasonable to suppose that the association of the lower forms of life has as much of value to tell us concerning that of the higher forms as has the function of the brain, or of the eye, for example, in the lower organisms to tell of that function in the higher organisms. A given associational form, factor, or center, which, as such, has had a development antecedent to its development among men, may reasonably be expected to have light thrown upon its higher phases by a careful consideration of its lower phases. A form of associational activity, the family for example, may be better studied in its more evolved stage, which we call the human family, if it is first studied in the lower stages of its development, let these be found where they may and be called as we will.

Of course, it is not assumed that the relation to each other of the terms in an evolutionary series has been adequately comprehended or explained. Between any pair of terms in any such series there intervenes a lacuna which we have not filled, but have simply ignored as by common consent. The terms of a genetic series are after all but the focal points of one side of a process, the beginning, the end, and the other sides of which we neither see nor are able to picture to ourselves in a satisfactory manner. It is conceiv-

¹ This assumption is so greatly in harmony with the spirit of the age that it has gone unquestioned for the most part. Whether this or that particular relation obtains between human association and animal association has been vigorously debated, but that *some* relation exists has seldom been denied.

able that when our knowledge relative to these shall have grown somewhat, the evolutionary hypothesis itself may be found subject to modifications of which we do not now dream.

Again, the anatomist, the physiologist, and the neurologist—the psychologist will presently be counted of this goodly company—in view of the great complexity of the subject-matter presented to each—a complexity the individual factors of which the facilities of no laboratory can possibly enable the investigator to isolate and study under controlled conditions—have found themselves compelled to descend the evolutionary series until they encounter in other reaches of nature a simpler condition of things than they must confront among human beings. Learning from this, they reascend the scale step by step, taking careful note of each new factor as it appears, until they stand again before their problem as it presents itself at the level of mankind; but now equipped with a knowledge of its genesis and a familiarity with its component parts which make of it a very much simpler problem indeed, though, to be sure, there are yet left difficulties enough and to spare. If these sciences are advantaged by extending their field of observation downward along the scale of life sufficiently to include the simpler and less evolved stages of their subject-matter, the question at once arises whether sociology would not be similarly advantaged by a similar process. The answer depends to a certain extent upon the nature of the subject-matter of sociology—whether it resembles that of the sciences alluded to above in those particular respects which have made such a proceeding so valuable to them.

Confining ourselves to the briefest and most comprehensive statement as to what, in actuality, has been, and is today, the subject-matter of sociology, we may say that it is *the association of human beings with each other*. The task which sociology has constantly striven to perform is the analysis and interpretation of this plexus of phenomena.¹ Let us see what the performance of this task involves.

¹ Long citations from the works of the various sociological writers in illustration of this would be tedious and superfluous. It is thought that the reader has only to call to mind the general outline of subjects treated and results arrived at in these works to be convinced of the fairness of the statement of the text.

By association¹ we mean, in the most general sense, activity¹ conceived either as incited in, or put forth by, one thing¹ in virtue of the existence of another; activity conceived as the expression,² and as the possible occasion, of the apparent constitution,² of the relations of one thing with another.

No dogmatic attempt is here made to fix the content of the term "association." It is far too early in the sociologic day for such an attempt to appear other than ill-timed. Usage, guided by the results of further research and by certain practical considerations, will probably determine in the end what this content shall be. But until usage shall have attained years of discretion and authority, it will be allowable for each writer to state for himself what meaning he will attach to the term. In the proper place the reasons will be given which have led the present writer to the use indicated in the text. Since this use is for the larger part one of the latest results, rather than the earliest pre-supposition, of the work which it is the task of these articles to outline, the end rather than the beginning of the account will manifestly be the most appropriate point at which to mass, and discuss in detail, these reasons. The only excuse for giving, thus early in the study, a tentative definition of the term is that the reader may have from the start a clue to what is meant when the word "association" is used in a given connection.

Now, this association, composed of the activities of the associating beings, is, in part at least, a function of what these beings are, and the complexity of this varies directly as does the complexity of the beings themselves.³ And if those sciences, some of which were enumerated above, which have as their task the comprehension and interpretation of what man is, are driven by the complexity of their subject-matter to consider what man was, how he evolved, what he was in that evolution, it seems a likely hypothesis that those sciences whose task is the analysis

¹ It is to be noted that "association" is here used in the sense of *associating* and that "activity" has a meaning far broader than would be covered by the expression "movement which has, or has had, psychic concomitants." The word "thing" is also used in the most general and inclusive sense.

² It is not intended to assert that we first have *unrelated* things which afterward become related in some mysterious manner. Things and their relations grow up together; but the fact of this growth seems to make it necessary to suppose an entering-in to the series of "an element of the new" (whatever that may mean) at appropriate points. To embrace both these facts we allude to the "expression" and to the "apparent constitution" of relations.

³ See HERBERT SPENCER, *Principles of Biology*, edition of 1884, Vol. I, p. 156.

and interpretation of what the relations, activities, associations of these complex beings are must also be driven to a consideration of what these were; and that accordingly sociology, in order to deal adequately with the association of human beings, must pay most careful and considerate attention to the association of beings lower than those we see fit to call human.¹ In view, therefore, of the characteristics of the phenomena to be dealt with and of the resulting difficulties involved in the attempt to isolate and observe under relatively simple conditions any particular aspect of the same, it seems not improbable that the comparative method, which has yielded such worthy results in other sciences confronted with a similar complexity of subject-matter, may be susceptible of fruitful application in the field of societary phenomena. For it is perhaps not an unwarrantable hypothesis that association has a genetic history corresponding, in large outlines at least, to that of the associating organisms.

It will at once be evident that from the standpoint here implied the distinctions between sociology and other sciences will be based upon considerations varying in their nature with the particular science which at a given time we may be seeking to distinguish from sociology. A ground of distinction which will hold good when certain others fail to do so will be found in what is usually designated by the phrase "point of view." Reference is made to that aspect of point of view under which it appears as the observer's mental attitude toward the phenomena under investigation. This basis of distinction is particularly useful in helping us to differentiate from each other branches of knowledge concerned with the analysis and interpretation of phenomena related to each other in the process of development. An integration of phenomena, which occurs in growth, is of such a nature as to give rise to some curious relations between a science proposing to deal with a given phase or stage of that integration and other sciences dealing with earlier stages or phases of the same. The latter are in a way propædæutic to the former,

¹It is here that the so-called "biological explanation of society"—the oft-heralded demise of which has a rhythmic periodicity deserving the attention of some astute investigator—may one day wreak a poetic vengeance upon those who are so fond of proclaiming its defunct condition.

while the former embodies in its subject-matter and point of view the subject-matter and points of view of the latter in a manner which makes the differentiating from each other of the sciences concerned a matter of less ease than might be supposed. One or two illustrations may help to make clear what is meant here. Before a given science (let us say psychology) shall be able to deal to the best advantage with certain phenomena (as those of vision), other sciences (in this case physics, chemistry, anatomy, and physiology) must each in turn have dealt to the fullest of their capabilities with the phenomena in question; and in so doing they will have prepared the phenomena¹ for the psychologist's consideration. Here the propædæutic relation, sustained by the first four sciences mentioned to psychology, is very plain. Another instance may better serve us in making more explicit the meaning implied in the reference to the second phase of this relation, made some lines above. Suppose we are bent upon an understanding of a commonplace hand clasp. We may say roughly that physics would be concerned with it as a group of physical changes; chemistry, as a group of chemical changes; anatomy, as an assemblage of bodily structures; physiology, with the functioning of these structures. Psychology would consider it in its bearing upon the structure and function of consciousness.

If this were all, the thing might be simple enough; but, unfortunately, things are not so simple here as they seem. In the case of the actual hand clasp we get no chemical change without including a physical change also; we get no functioning of the bodily structures without having bound up with it both chemical changes and physical changes; and we get no functioning without appropriate structures. When the psychologist comes to consider, in its relation to consciousness, this complex of phenomena we call a hand clasp, he must deal with it as an assemblage of bodily structures, as a functioning of these structures, as a group of chemical changes, and as a group of physical changes; and in so dealing with it he must use the light thrown

¹ The same thing may be put from the other side by saying, "prepared the psychologist to investigate the phenomena."

upon it by physics, chemistry, anatomy, and physiology. At this stage of the proceedings it becomes greatly desirable to find some mark which will keep one's conception of psychology from incontinently swallowing the conception one may have formed of any one of the other sciences mentioned. It seems to the writer that such a mark is found in that aspect of "point of view" before referred to.¹ While the psychologist, as such, must consider the same aspect of the complex of phenomena as does the physiologist, for example, and from the same standpoint also (*in so far as is implied in seeing as clearly as does the physiologist the hand clasp as the functioning of certain bodily structures*), it yet remains true that while so seeing it he sees it *as centripetal* to a different focus of attention from that toward which the physiologist orients it. The psychologist sees it as centripetal to the one focal point of attention called "consciousness," and he sees it as centrifugal to all else. It is in this point of most intense attention, in this focusing of the facts, in this direction of greatest stress, that we find a characteristic upon which to base a distinction which will serve to differentiate the sciences from each other at times when classifications based upon certain other grounds fail to remain valid.

And with this distinction in mind we may say of the psychologist that he may consider anything in the heavens above or in the earth beneath, and so long as he considers it with reference to the structure and function of consciousness, no man may say him nay, or justly complain that he invades the "fields" of the other sciences.

We return now to the sociologist, who has been purposely left out of account for a time. In his consideration of the hand clasp his attention's focal point will be upon the associating of the persons whose hands so meet, as expressed, or as set up, in the hand clasp. It is in whatever the hand clasp has to tell him of this that the sociologist is interested. But in order to be able to understand what the hand clasp has to tell him—in order to understand its language, if the figure may be allowed—he must

¹Of course, it must not be inferred from this that the writer is seeking to advance this as a panacea for taxonomic ills.

know what the hand clasp is physiologically, psychologically, ethically, chemically, physically; and in order thus to know what it is, he must be able to see it from the standpoints of the sciences in question.[†] It must be remembered constantly that the sociologist wants to know about the associating, the relating, the reciprocity, of the persons concerned in this hand clasp, as that associating is expressed in, or set up by, the hand clasp. And if he would thoroughly comprehend this, he must avail himself of analyses of this act which sift it to its very ultimates. He must know what it means when seen from the standpoints of those sciences which have made it their task to study it from their own points of view. It may be to them state of consciousness, bodily function, or physical change; and while it will be to him also state of consciousness, bodily function, and physical change, yet, translating these into terms of association, he will read them as the components or phases — psychical, physiological, physical — of the association of the persons concerned as expressed, or as instituted, in the act named. In other words, while he will see the phenomena as state of consciousness, bodily function, and physical change, and see them in these differing aspects as clearly as does the psychologist, the physiologist, or the physicist, he will none the less see them in every case as centripetal to his attention's focus, *i. e.*, the associating, the relating, the reciprocal functioning, of the persons concerned.

Thus we are brought to a point where we may say of the sociologist, as we have said of the psychologist: Let him consider any fact the relation of which to his task he can make clear, and so long as he considers it as centripetal to his attention's focus — the association of human beings — he cannot justly be complained

[†] This does not mean that the sociologist must be ethical philosopher, physiologist, psychologist, chemist, and physicist, in the sense of being a specialist in each, any more than the psychologist dealing with vision must be specialist enough in physics, or physiology, or chemistry, or anatomy, to have discovered and formulated the principles he uses which belong to these respective domains of science. The sociologist need not have elaborated all the data he uses, any more than the biologist needs to have elaborated his microscope. But he must be able to see the meaning of those data from the standpoint of the man who elaborated them, just as clearly as possible, if he proposes to make a proper use of them for his own purposes.

of as an intruder, or as an interloper in fields of research already covered by the investigations of other sciences.

Primarily, then, the focus of the sociologist's attention will be upon the association of human beings ; upon their reciprocity ; upon their activities, considered as functional relations and as functional relatings of man to man ; briefly and somewhat figuratively, upon human beings as functions of each other. As sociologist he will see all things else as centripetal to this. To learn in what this association consists, both as a whole and in any given phase ; to analyze it to the last degree ; to learn how it came to be ; to discover its meaning and the laws of its growth : these are tasks to which the sociologist dedicates his energies. But he has not gone far toward the performance of these before he discovers that human association is a thing with a history, and that in order to comprehend it he must study it historically. It represents an evolution, a development, and can be thoroughly understood in its later stages only by being thoroughly understood in its earlier stages. It is a term in a great series, and as such its relations to the other terms demand careful attention. It is also an epitome of a great series, and the nature and growth of that epitomization, together with the relations to each other, and to the whole, of the epitomized parts, must be painstakingly traced out. It is a many-phased and many-factored complex of phenomena, and each phase and factor must be subjected to exhaustive and methodical research. Thus out of the sociologist's primary attempt to describe and interpret human association there grows, as naturally and inevitably as root from seed, the necessity of the further attempt to describe and interpret association as it is found among forms of life less complex than the human form ; just as out of the attempt to understand the human physique there arose the demand for an understanding of the physique of allied, though lower, forms.

It would seem that in response to this necessity a comparative sociology must sooner or later be wrought out. It cannot be produced by one or by any fixed number of investigators. When it assumes its rightful proportions, it will not be a mere addendum to sociology as it is now known, or to some other

than a comparative sociology. Quite the contrary. It will be a growing organism into which will be assimilated and integrated the labors of successive workers, each of whom will have devoted himself more or less exclusively to the consideration of some one phase or factor of the whole. It is not impossible that the comparative method in sociology, from being considered at first as a mere method, and later as a method plus certain results, will later still be seen to be the best available symbol of the habits of growth according to which the reality considered has developed and continues to develop; and in accordance with which also the science of that reality has had, and must continue to have, its evolution. For only so can sociology become that which it is an ambition of every science to become eventually, *i. e.*, a perfect account of the actual constitution and behavior of that aspect of reality, the importance of which to human interest has called into being the science in question.

Since the application of the comparative method¹ to a given subject-matter implies that those portions of that subject-matter which it is proposed to compare with each other exhibit some common trait or are susceptible of being viewed from a common standpoint, and since, in accordance with the foregoing, we assume that the subject-matter of sociology is susceptible of having applied to it the comparative method, the question arises at once: What are these common traits, what are these common standpoints, which will serve as fundamentals upon which to base our comparative study of the phenomena of association? For, up to a certain degree, the more numerous and the more constant these may be, the more likely is the application of the comparative method to yield a body of data of sufficient importance to rise to the dignity of a science.

¹ The words "the comparative method" are not unambiguous. The whole process of gaining knowledge is a comparison of one thing with another. *The* comparative method may be roughly characterized as a specialization of this general process applied to data bearing a certain serial relation to each other. This relation is usually that obtaining in the genetic series. Organisms and their activities, structures and their functions, have an evolution. To comprehend them in a given phase of that evolution we study them in other phases, higher and lower, both in ontogenetic and in phylogenetic series. To do this is, generally speaking, to follow the comparative method, as it is commonly received.

That there are certain factors—possibly certain groups of factors—which make their appearance in the earliest and simplest forms of the associational complex, and are distinctly traceable, under such modifications as development may be expected to entail, throughout the whole range of those forms, from that displayed by primitive protoplasm to that displayed by the most highly civilized man, is a hypothesis which, in a more or less clearly recognized way, underlies a large proportion of the sociological work of our time.¹ But the clear demonstration of what these common factors are, and the exhibition of their relation to each other and to the remaining factors, is a task which in large measure yet remains to be performed. The reasons for this are manifest. Its performance is involved in the continuous growth of a science of comparative sociology, and the one cannot be completed short of the completion of the other. From this it may readily enough be seen why the answer to the questions just proposed is one which cannot be given in advance of the actual work of analysis and interpretation of the whole societary complex, for this analysis and interpretation is necessary to the discovery and determination of the existence and nature of these factors. The work is more than the mere tracing out of the interconnections of factors the existence and characteristics of which have previously been well known. We are confronted with a case in which the task of discovery and that of development, or exhibition, are two mutually dependent processes, and the continuance of the one is momentarily conditioned upon the continuance of the other. Highly desirable though it may be to be able at this stage to point out in a perfectly clear and definite manner those factors, the existence of which will afford us a common ground upon which to compare with each other the different terms of the associational series, it is, nevertheless, impossible. We might quite as reasonably expect the explorer of an unknown country to furnish us, in advance of his explorations, with a detailed map of the land he expects to visit. We must content ourselves for the present with the assumption that such common factors do exist, and leave the proof of

¹ See, for example, GIDDINGS, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 61 ff.

their existence, together with a delineation of their characteristics and affiliations, to the progress of the science.

But, while one may refuse to make the attempt to describe in advance of their exploration the fields of a new science, he might less readily be excused for leaving his readers with no hint as to the general direction his own immediate excursions into those fields may be expected to take. While making no pretense, therefore, to enumerate the common factors which future investigation may find to exist in the different terms of the associational series, some slight attempt will be made to indicate, in a preliminary way, the nature of those common factors, the relations of which to the various forms of the associational complex this series of papers may be expected to consider in due time.

It will be remembered that the subject-matter of sociology was tentatively defined ¹ to be the activities of living organisms, *when these activities are considered from a certain focal point of attention*; and that the description and interpretation of these activities, viewed in this orientation, were posited ² as the most immediate task of sociology.

It is significant that among those characteristics of the activities of things which are earliest to command attention, none is more striking than that of their apparent dependence upon antecedent activities. When the consequent activity is that of living matter, we call it a response to the antecedent activity which is considered to be the stimulus of its consequent. Postponing for the present the consideration of some very important peculiarities of the more intimate nature of this stimulus-organism-response relationship, we have to note here that it obtains generally throughout the whole range of living matter. There is no activity of any organism which can conceivably be without appropriate relations to adequate stimuli. Again, these stimuli are separable into certain great groups and classes. There seems a reasonable possibility, then, that the activities of living matter will themselves be separable into groupings analogous to the groupings of their stimuli; and, owing to the

¹ See p. 675.

connection of the organism with its own activities, and through these with the stimuli of these activities, it would not be a matter of great surprise if further research should reveal a grouping of organisms corresponding to the groupings of stimuli and activities. Furthermore, we might hope to find a development in the nature of these groupings which shall proceed *pari passu* with the development of the stimulability of the organism. It would also be a matter of some interest to afford a tentative classification of stimuli based upon the duration of the period during which they are respectively operant upon the organism's evolution. It would be found, of course, that while certain groups of stimuli affect living matter from its earliest to its latest developmental phase, certain other groups are effective during a comparatively limited number of these phases.

These are but hints of a whole series of problems of greater or less interest which are suggested for solution *à propos* of this stimulus-organism-response relationship. For the present we shall address ourselves to the attempt to describe and analyze the associational phenomena incident to the affecting of organic life by certain of the great groups of stimuli.¹

By way of recapitulating the contents of the foregoing pages we may say :

1. That the subject-matter of sociology, as determined by an inspection of the work thus far done in the science, has been chiefly the activities of human beings, when these activities are considered as oriented toward a certain focal point of attention
2. That the task of sociology, as determined by a similar inspection, has been the analysis and interpretation of these activities as seen in this orientation.
3. That the attempts to perform this task have demonstrated

¹The value in the associational life of mankind of that group of stimuli we call "sex" is being considered in the pages of this Journal by Professor William I. Thomas. As the work of the present writer is, in a measure, an attempt to carry into the domains of the lower forms of life the methods and type of research used by Professor Thomas among the races of mankind, the reader is referred to the articles in question. See AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Vol. I, pp. 434-45; Vol. III, pp. 31-63, 754-76; Vol. IV, pp. 474-88. The next paper of the series, "Sex in Primitive Morality," is to appear in the May number of this Journal.

the nature of this subject-matter to be such as to demand that it be studied in the simpler phases of its development, as well as in the more complex phases, if we are to hope to arrive at an adequate understanding of any given phase. It is a corollary of this that, if we are to comprehend perfectly any given type of association as it appears among human beings, we must study it as it appears among beings lower than human, if it be found to have an existence among these lower beings.

4. That this comparison of one phase with another, higher or lower in the genetic series of associational phenomena, means nothing less than the application of the comparative method to the subject-matter of sociology.

5. That, in consideration of the nature of the relations obtaining between the activities of living organisms and certain great groups of stimuli, it appears that these stimulus-complexes afford bases upon which to attempt a comparison of the organism- and the activity-groupings growing up around these complexes.

RALPH G. KIMBLE.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.